Most applications of Nash bargaining over wages ignore between-employer competition for labor services and attribute all of the workers'rent to their bargaining power. In this paper, we write and estimate an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search and use it to take another look at the determinants of wages in France. There are three essential determinants of wages in our model: productivity, competition between employers resulting from on-the-job search, and the workers' bargaining power. We …nd that between-…rm competition matters a lot in the determination of wages, as it is quantitatively more important than wage bargaining à la Nash in raising wages above the workers'"reservation wages", de…ned as out-of-work income. In particular, we detect no signi…cant bargaining power for intermediate-and low-skilled workers, and a modestly positive bargaining power for high-skilled workers.
Introduction
When between-employer competition for labor services is not perfect, …rm-worker matches are associated with a positive rent, de…ned as the expected value of future match output ‡ows net of the worker's and …rm's outside options. Understanding how these rents are shared between workers and employers necessitates a complete characterization of the determinants of those outside options. Labor market competition is crucial in this respect: even in an imperfectly competitive labor market, it is in the workers'interest to prompt inter…rm competition through on-the-job search. Yet the existing literature on labor market rent-sharing generally understates the role of inter…rm competition for two main reasons. First, the vast majority of contributions to this literature ignores on-thejob search altogether. Second, in cases where on-the-job search is permitted, incumbent employers are not allowed to counter outside o¤ers.
In this paper, we propose an equilibrium model with strategic wage bargaining, onthe-job search and counter-o¤ers. The model builds on Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), which is a competitive model with search frictions. In the extension that we consider here, unemployed workers negotiate with a single employer in a conventional way, but when an employed worker receives an outside job o¤er, a three-player bargaining process is started between the worker, her/his initial employer and the employer which made the outside o¤er. We explicitly model this bargaining process using a version of the Rubinstein (1982) in…nite-horizon, alternating-o¤ers bargaining game. This allows us to relate workers'market power, i.e. the share of the match surplus that they obtain from the negotiation, to other structural search friction parameters.
Related work includes Dey and Flinn (2003) who consider a rent-sharing model featuring the same wage-productivity relationship as in our paper, yet without providing a rigorous non cooperative game-theoretic foundation for that relationship. 1 Mortensen (2003) develops a search-matching model with on-the-job search and examines a variety of ad hoc wage setting mechanisms, covering the whole spectrum from the monopoly union case through Nash bargaining, all the way to monopsony wage setting. Shimer (2005) studies wage bargaining in a simple economy with on-the-job search and compares the equilibrium wage distribution with the one predicted by Burdett and Mortensen (1998) .
He does not allow employers to counter outside o¤ers and thus does not extend Rubinstein's setup to a three-player game. Lastly, Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) was the …rst paper to estimate a search-matching model, albeit without on-the-job search, on micro data.
We estimate our structural model on a 1993-2000 panel of matched employer-employee
French administrative data. This data contains …rm-level information on value added, wages and hours worked by labor category (based on occupation). One of the important empirical novelties of this paper is that we are able to use wage data on one side and productivity data on the other and see whether our wage equation correctly captures the link between the two. To our knowledge, this is the …rst estimation of an equilibrium search model which uses actual productivity data instead of predicting the distribution of productivity that best matches the distribution of wages. Our estimated model is found to correctly replicate the empirical wage-productivity relationship. In particular, we …nd that …rm-level mean wages are below labor productivity, with a mark-up increasing from zero at low-productivity …rms to about 100% at high-productivity …rms.
We estimate a very low bargaining power for "unskilled" workers (workers with no managerial tasks), between 0 and 20%, depending on the particular industry considered, and a somewhat higher value for "skilled"workers (supervisors of all ranks and engineers), between 20% and 40%. Most existing studies …nd higher values for workers'bargaining power. 2 If we end up estimating a much lower bargaining power coe¢ cient than in the literature, although match productivity and worker wages follow the same de…nition, this is because our de…nition of the match rent is di¤erent. Allowing for on-the-job search and employers' countero¤ers raises workers' outside options signi…cantly. Now, using a more conventional de…nition of a match quasi-rent, namely, match output minus minimum wage, our model suggests the following decomposition of the share of the quasi- 2 A far from exhaustive list of which includes Abowd and Lemieux (1993), Blanch ‡ower, Oswald and Sanfrey (1996) , Van Reenen (1996) , Margolis and Salvanes (2001) , . These studies are based on static models where some bargaining process leads to splitting the job surplus, typically de…ned as the di¤erence between productivity and some outside wage that depends on worker characteristics and selected labor market variables such as the (local) unemployment rate and the industry-or economy-wide mean wage rent that goes to the worker into two components: …rst, the contribution of between…rm competition for labor services and second, the outcome of the negotiation with the employer. Overall we …nd the former source of worker rent acquisition to be quantitatively much more important than the latter, in that if we shut down wage bargaining in our model, competition alone is still typically found to explain more than a half (and up to 100% in the case of low-skill workers) of the workers'quasi-rent share.
Our model thus o¤ers an encompassing structural view of wage determination. By explicitly accounting for on-the-job search, we leave ample scope for labor market competition to a¤ect wages. By reducing the role of bargaining, we make wage determination less dependent on exogenous "black-box" parameters such as preferences or bargaining power. This is important for understanding the e¤ect on wages of policy interventions.
For example, our model suggests that sources of upward pressure on unskilled wages are mostly external to wage setting procedures and should rather be sought among parameters a¤ecting the general competitive environment in which wages are determined (such as out-of-work income or payroll taxes).
That labor market competition is found to matter a lot in wage determination in France can sound somewhat surprising. First, the reputed "sclerosis"of the French labor market, where worker and …rm unions negotiate wages at the industry level for all lowand medium-skill occupations, may have lead to the presumption that negotiation should play a major role in determining wages in France. 3 Second, high institutional wage ‡oors in France possibly weaken the correlation between wages and productivity (especially for unskilled workers), and could potentially drive our …nding of unskilled workers having very little bargaining power. 4 However, the explicit incorporation of a minimum wage in our framework suggests that this is not the case: we …nd that low-skill labor categories do get a share of the job surplus over and above what would be implied by the sole presence of the minimum wage, and that this extra bit of worker rent can be attributed to between-…rm competition.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we develop the theory. In section 3 The high coverage rate of collective bargaining (about 95%) may indeed suggest that wages are primarily in ‡uenced by collective agreements. However, analyses of French wage data in the light of French wage setting institutions have shown that individual and match-speci…c heterogeneity in productivity explain a remarkably high share of wage di¤erentials (Goux and Maurin, 1999, Abowd et al., 2005) . 4 The minimum wage covers about 15% of the employed workforce in France. 3 we use the theoretical model of section 2 to estimate the in ‡uence of productivity, between-…rm competition and the bargaining power of workers on wages. In section 4 we use our model to assess the relative quantitative importance of those wage determinants and conclude that labor market competition plays a primary part. Section 5 concludes.
Theory
We …rst describe the characteristics and objectives of workers and …rms. The matching process and the negotiation game that workers and …rms play to determine wages is then explained. In the last subsection, the steady-state equilibrium of this labor market is characterized.
Workers and …rms
We consider a labor market in which a measure M of atomistic workers face a continuum of competitive …rms, with a mass normalized to 1, that produce one unique multi-purpose good. Time is continuous, workers and …rms live forever. The market unemployment rate is denoted by u. The pool of unemployed workers is steadily replenished by layo¤s that occur at the exogenous Poisson rate .
Workers have di¤erent skills. A given worker's ability is measured by the amount " of e¢ ciency units of labor s/he supplies per unit time. The distribution of ability in the population of workers is exogenous, with cdf H over the interval [" min ; " max ]. We only consider continuous ability distributions and designate the corresponding density by h.
Summation of ability values over all employees in a given …rm de…nes e¢ cient …rm size. Firms di¤er in the technologies that they operate: marginal productivity of e¢ cient labor (denoted as p) is …rm-speci…c and is distributed across …rms with a cdf over the support [p min ; p max ]. This latter distribution is assumed continuous with density . The marginal productivity of a match ("; p) between a worker with ability " and a …rm with technology p is "p.
A type-" unemployed worker receives an income ‡ow of "b, with b a positive constant, which s/he has to forgo upon …nding a job. Being unemployed is thus equivalent to working at a "virtual" …rm with labor productivity equal to b that would operate in a Walrasian labor market, therefore paying each employee their marginal productivity, "b.
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Workers discount the future at an exogenous and constant rate > 0 and seek to maximize the expected discounted sum of future utility ‡ows. For simplicity, we assume that the instantaneous utility ‡ow enjoyed from a ‡ow of income x is U (x) = x. Firms maximize pro…ts.
Matching and wage bargaining
Firms and workers are brought together pairwise through a sequential, random and time consuming search process. Speci…cally, unemployed workers sample job o¤ers sequentially at Poisson rate 0 . Employees may also search for a better job while employed and the arrival rate of o¤ers to on-the-job searchers is 1 . We treat 1 as an exogenous parameter. 6 The type p of the …rm from which a given o¤er originates is assumed to be randomly selected from [p min ; p max ] according to a sampling distribution with cdf F (and F 1 F ) and density f . The sampling distribution is the same for all workers irrespective of their ability or employment status. When a match is formed, the wage contract is negotiated between the di¤erent parties following a set of rules that we now explain.
Wages are bargained over by workers and employers in a complete information context. In particular, all agents that are brought to interact by the random matching process are perfectly aware of one another's types. All wage and job o¤ers are also perfectly observed and veri…able. Wage contracts stipulate a …xed wage that can be renegotiated by mutual agreement only: renegotiations thus occur only if one party can credibly threaten the other to leave the match for good if the latter refuses to renegotiate. There are no renegotiation costs.
Bargaining with unemployed workers. When an unemployed worker meets a …rm, the wage is determined as the outcome of a Rubinstein (1982) in…nite horizon game 5 We assume that the ‡ow opportunity cost of employment is proportional to individual ability essentially because this is the most tractable form. As is explained in Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), and as will become clear from the analysis below, the substantive consequence of this (admittedly disputable) assumption is to rule out sorting: …rst, the distribution of ability is the same in the population of employees as in the population as a whole, second, it is independent of the employer's type.
6 Endogenizing 1 at the macro level using a matching function à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides, as in Mortensen (2000) , is not attractive given the paper's main objective. Endogenizing 1 at a more micro level by allowing for endogenous worker search e¤ort, as in Christensen, Lentz, Mortensen, Neumann and Werwatz (2005) , may be of greater importance for our purposes. We leave this extension to further research as Christensen et al.'s paper show that this is by no means a trivial one. of alternating o¤ers, the precise structure and solution of which are characterized in Appendix A. This game delivers the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where the worker receives a constant share of the match rent. This latter parameter is referred to as the worker's bargaining power.
Formally, let V 0 (") denote the lifetime utility of an unemployed worker of type " and V ("; w; p) that of the same worker when employed at a …rm of type p and paid a wage w. When the worker is paid her/his marginal productivity "p, the employer makes zero marginal pro…t on this worker who therefore receives the entire match value, V ("; "p; p). Further assuming that a vacant job has zero value to the employer, the di¤erence between the match value V ("; "p; p) and the unemployment value de…nes the match surplus: V ("; "p; p) V 0 ("). The bargained wage on a match between a type-" unemployed worker and a type-p …rm, denoted as 0 ("; p), solves:
This equation merely states that a type-" unemployed worker matched with a type-p …rm obtains her/his reservation utility, V 0 ("), plus a share of the match surplus.
Bargaining with employed workers. When an employed worker contacts an outside …rm, the situation becomes more favorable to the worker because s/he can now force the incumbent and poaching employers to compete. 7 A formal presentation of the relevant strategic bargaining game is given in Appendix A, and we use here a simple heuristic argument to derive the sharing rule.
Let there be a worker of ability " and two would-be employers of productivity levels p and p 0 > p. Competition between the two employers over the worker's services can be seen as an auction where the bidder with the higher valuation wins and pays the 7 Whenever the worker receives an outside o¤er, the pre-existing contract with the incumbent employer prevails if no agreement is reached. This is an important di¤erence with the negotiation on new matchesbetween unemployed workers and …rms-that are dissolved in case of disagreement. We view this assumption as more in accordance with actual labor market institutions than the usual one according to which matches always break up in case of renegotiation failure (Pissarides, 2000, Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) . It is indeed legally considered in most OECD countries, and especially in France, that an o¤er to modify the terms of a contract does not constitute a repudiation. Accordingly, a rejection of the o¤er by either party leaves the pre-existing terms in place, which means that the job continues under those terms if the renegotiation fails (Malcomson, 1999 (Malcomson, , p. 2321 ). This also suggests that the assumption of renegotiation by mutual agreement captures an important and often neglected feature of employment contracts (again, see the enlightening survey by Malcomson, 1999 So, there exists a threshold q("; w; p) (formally de…ned by ("; q; p) = w), such that:
q("; w; p), then the workers keeps the current wage contract w in …rm p;
(ii) if p p 0 > q("; w; p), the worker obtains a wage raise ("; p 0 ; p) w > 0 from her/his current employer.
(iii) if p 0 > p, the worker moves to …rm p 0 for a wage ("; p; p 0 ).
Note that whenever p 0 > p, the wage ("; p; p 0 ) obtained in the new …rm can be smaller than the wage w paid in the previous job, because the worker expects larger wage rises in …rms with higher productivity. This option value e¤ect implies that workers may be willing to take wage cuts just to move from a low-to a high-productivity …rm.
Finally, since the workers' bargaining power is a focal point of this paper, we de…nitely need to explain where it comes from. The kind of alternating-o¤er, in…nite-horizon bargaining games à la Rubinstein that we are invoking as a foundation for our wage equations (1) and (2) predict that the bargaining power potentially depends on other structural parameters, namely the discount rates of each party, their response time (i.e. the amount of time it takes to each party to formulate an o¤er), and also on the ‡ow probability of match breakup during the bargaining rounds (see Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990 ). In our framework this implies that potentially depends on the discount rate ( ), on the arrival rate of job o¤ers ( 0 or 1 ), on the time it takes to each party to formulate an o¤er at each negotiation round-i.e. the players'response times, and …nally on the breakdown rate of the ongoing negotiation. However, we show in Appendix A that as this breakdown rate becomes large compared to the transition rates and the players'discount rates, the bargaining power is reduced to a function of the parties'relative response times only. Speci…cally, is an increasing function of worker's ability to formulate o¤ers quickly (relative to the employer) and is otherwise independent of the arrival rate of job o¤ers or any other structural parameter. So can indeed be considered a separate structural parameter which speci…cally re ‡ects the workers'ability to voice claims during bilateral negotiations with employers.
The wage equation
The precise form of wages can be obtained from the expressions of lifetime utilities (see Appendix B for the corresponding algebra). The wage ("; p 0 ; p) of a type-" worker, currently working at a type-p …rm and whose last job o¤er emanated from a type-p 0 …rm, is de…ned by:
This expression shows that the returns to on-the-job search depend on the bargaining power parameter . It can be seen that outside o¤ers cause wage increases within the …rm only if employers have some bargaining power. In the limiting case where = 1, the worker appropriates all the surplus up-front and gets a wage equal to "p, whether or not s/he searches on the job. In the opposite extreme case, where = 0, the wage increases as outside o¤ers come since all o¤ers from …rms of type p 0 2 (q("; w; p); p] cause within-…rm wage raises.
The wage 0 ("; p); obtained by a type-" unemployed workers when matched with a type-p …rm, writes as:
where p inf is the lowest viable marginal productivity of labor. The latter is de…ned as the productivity value that is just su¢ cient to compensate an unemployed worker for her/his forgone value of unemployment, given that s/he would be paid her/his marginal productivity, thus letting the …rm with zero pro…ts. Analytically:
It is worth noting that the lower support of observed marginal productivity levels, that we denote by p min , can be strictly above the lower support of viable productivity levels p inf , for instance if free entry is not guaranteed on the search market.
The de…nition (4) of 0 ("; p) together with the de…nition (5) of p inf shows that entry wages, received by individuals who exit from unemployment, are not necessarily higher than unemployment income. It actually appears that those wages are always smaller than unemployment income if workers have no bargaining power, because accepting a job is a means to obtain future wage raises. Entry wages obviously increase with the bargaining power parameter .
We conclude this section by commenting on comparative statics. The wage function ("; p; p 0 ) decreases with 1 and F (in the sense of …rst-order stochastic ordering), and increases with . These properties re ‡ect an option value e¤ect: workers are willing to pay today for higher future earnings prospects. Of course ("; p; p 0 ) increases with the bargaining power, . It also increases with worker ability " and the type p of the less competitive employer, as both Bertrand competition and Nash-bargaining work in tandem to push wages up. However, we note an ambiguous e¤ect of the type p 0 of the employer winning the auction: ("; p; p 0 ) decreases with p 0 if is small enough for the option value e¤ect to dominate. A high p 0 means that the upper bound put on future renegotiated wages is more remote (as it is equal to p 0 ) and the worker is thus willing to trade lower present wages for a promise of higher future wages. Yet ("; p; p 0 ) increases with p 0 if is large enough for the bargaining power e¤ect on rent sharing to take over the option value e¤ect.
Steady-state equilibrium
We know from what precedes that a type-" employee of a type-p …rm is currently paid a wage w that is either equal to 0 ("; p) = ("; p inf ; p) if w is the …rst wage after unemployment, or is equal to ("; q; p), with p inf p min < q p, if the last wage mobility is the outcome of a bargain between the worker, the incumbent employer and another …rm of type q. The cross-sectional distribution of wages therefore has three components: a worker …xed e¤ect ("), an employer …xed e¤ect (p) and a random e¤ect (q) that characterizes the most recent wage mobility. In this section we determine the joint distribution of these three components.
In a steady state a fraction u of workers is unemployed and a density`("; p) of type-" workers is employed at type-p …rms. Let`(p) = R "max " min`( "; p)d" be the density of employees working at type-p …rms. The average size of a …rm of type p is then equal to
We designate the corresponding cdfs with capital letters L("; p) and L(p), and we let G(wj"; p) represent the cdf of the (not absolutely continuous, as we shall see)
conditional distribution of wages within the set of workers of ability " within type-p …rms.
The steady state assumption implies that in ‡ows must balance out ‡ows for all stocks of workers de…ned by a status (unemployed or employed), a personal type ", a wage w, an employer type p. The relevant ‡ow-balance equations are spelled out in Appendix C.
They lead to the following series of de…nitions/results:
Unemployment rate:
Distribution of …rm types across employed workers: The fraction of workers employed at a …rm with mpl less than p is
with 1 = 1 , and the density of workers in …rms of type p follows from di¤erenti-ation as`(
Distribution of matches: The density of matches ("; p) is
Within-…rm distribution of wages: The fraction of employees of ability " in …rms with mpl p is
where q ("; w; p), de…ned equation (A.9) in Appendix B, stands for the threshold value of the productivity of new matches above which a type-" employee with a current wage w can get a wage increase.
Equation (6) is standard in equilibrium search models (see Burdett and Mortensen, 1998 ) and merely relates the unemployment rate to unemployment in-and out ‡ows.
Equation (7) is a particularly important empirical relationship as it will allow us to back out the sampling distribution F from its empirical counterpart L. 8 Equation (9) implies that, under the model's assumptions, the within-…rm distribution of individual heterogeneity is independent of …rm types. Nothing thus prevents the formation of highly dissimilar pairs (low ", high p, or low p, high ") if pro…table to both the …rm and the worker. This results from the assumptions of constant returns to worker ability ", both in and out of employment, scalar heterogeneity and undirected search.
Estimation
The estimation of the structural model goes through the following simple steps. Firmlevel labor productivity identi…es …rm type p. We use worker data on jobs and employment durations to draw inference on the job o¤er arrival rate 1 and the job destruction rate . The empirical distribution of …rm-level labor productivity among workers identi…es the distribution of …rm types p across employees, L(p). The intercept and slope parameters of the regressions of log wages on log productivity by occupation and industry identify mean worker ability " and the bargaining power .
We describe the data before explaining the estimation procedure in greater detail.
Then, we discuss the results.
Data
We use a matched employer-employee panel of French data collected by the French National Statistical Institute (INSEE) and covering the period 1993-2000. This panel contains standard accounting information extracted from the BRN ("Béné…ces Réels
Normaux ") …rm data source: total compensation costs, value added, current operating surplus, gross productive assets, etc. The BRN data are supposedly exhaustive of all private companies (not establishments) with a sales turnover of more than 3.5 million FRF (about 530,000 Euros) and liable to corporate taxes. 9 In addition, we use the DADS ("Déclarations Annuelles de Données Sociales") worker data source to compute labor costs and employment at the company level for various worker (skill) categories. The DADS data are based on mandatory employer (establishments) reports of the earnings of each salaried employee of the private sector subject to French payroll taxes over one given year. This is a very large dataset, which we "collapse"by …rm and worker category and then merge with the BRN dataset to obtain our base sample. Category #3: Clerical employees, skilled production workers;
Category #4: Sales workers, unskilled production and service employees.
In the sequel, we shall refer to "workers of observed skill level s", for s = 1; : : : ; 4, where our prior is that a worker's observed "skill level"(loosely de…ned though this latter term may be) is a decreasing function of the worker's category index, s.
Given this classi…cation of workers, we then split our base panel into four panels of …rm data on value-added, employment and average labor costs by skill category covering the period 1993-2000 and corresponding to four distinct industries: Manufacturing, Construction, Trade and Services. Finally, these four panels were balanced and …rms with strictly less than 10 employees in total were removed. This …nal trimming leaves us with four seven-year panels, involving an approximate total of just under 3 million workers distributed into 50,000 …rms each year. we see that our four industries are somewhat di¤erent in size (as measured by the total number of either …rms or workers), and in the structure of their workforce. In this latter respect, the Construction sector stands out in that it seems to employ an especially large share of medium-skilled production workers (s = 3), and very few of the extreme categories (s = 1 or 4) within relatively small …rms. In spite of these di¤erences, the skill category s = 3 is by a substantial amount the most numerous-and therefore presumably the most heterogeneous-in all four industries. A last feature of Table 1 that may be worth mentioning at this point is the numbers in parentheses in the rightmost column.
Those are the relative mean wages of labor categories 1, 2 and 3 to category 4. We see that the wage hierarchy follows our prior about the ranking of the observed skill levels. There are interindustry di¤erences in those wage ratios, with the Construction sector once more being remarkable in that it is the sector where cross-occupational wage inequality is most important.
< Table 1 (descriptive statistics) about here. >
Finally, estimating the model requires data on worker mobility. We use the French Labor Force Survey ("Enquête Emploi") which is a three-year rotating panel of individual professional trajectories similar to the American CPS ("Current Population Survey"). We prefer to use the LFS panel instead of the larger DADS panel as the latter is known to be a¤ected by large attrition biases. Moreover, the LFS is precisely designed to study unemployment and worker mobility.
Productivity
The production data (the BRN …rm accounting data) is a set of N T observations of valueadded (Y jt ), the book value of capital (K jt ) and the number of working hours (divided by 2028 = 52 39) of skill category s = 1; :::; 4 used by …rm j in year t (M sjt ), where j = 1; :::; N is the …rm index and t = 1; ::; T the time index.
We assume, as in the theory laid out in the preceding section, that the distribution of abilities in the sth skill category within each …rm ‡uctuates around some …xed density, say h s ("). Assuming further that workers are perfectly substitutable between skill categories as well as within, we de…ne the total amount of e¢ cient labor employed at …rm j at time t as
where s R "h s (") d" is the steady-state mean ability in category s.
We then specify …rm j's total per-period output (value-added) as the following constantreturn, Cobb-Douglas function of capital and e¢ cient labor:
where j is a …rm-speci…c productivity parameter and jt is a zero-mean, stationary productivity shock independent of the …xed e¤ect j . Elatsicities and ares between 0 and 1 and are common to all …rms within a given industry. We normalize 4 to one and leave j free.
Using the panel of …rm data on value-added, employment and capital, we estimate equation (13) in log form by iterated GMM using lagged …rst-di¤erences of the production function gradient as instruments, 12 i.e.
where we set 0 s equal to cross-category mean wage ratios. The estimates are thus consistent if jt is MA(2). 13 Con…dence intervals are obtained by boostrapping (with 12 The model being nonlinear, it is well known since Chamberlain (1992) that the optimal vector of instruments is equal to the conditional expectation of the gradient of the production function (with respect to the parameters) given all instruments. 13 We use instruments lagged three times based on the Sargan overidenti…cation test. The Sargan test statistic drops sharply between 2 and 3 in all industries save for the puzzling case of Construction. Three is also the minimum number of lags for which the p-value is nonzero at computer precision in all industries. the necessary re-centering for bootstrap to work in case of overidenti…cation).
14 Results. Estimates of ; and = ( 1 ; 2 ; 3 ; 4 ), are displayed in Table 2 . These bring about two comments. First, it turns out that in spite of the large number of …rms that we have in our sample, the precision of the production function parameter estimates obtained by direct GMM estimation is poor. This will induce us to design an alternative estimation procedure for that set of parameters and to check our results'robustness (see below subsection 3.4). Second, the estimated returns to capital are very low (between 0.04 and 0.08, depending on the industry and estimator considered). Zero returns to capital cannot even be rejected in Construction or Trade. Conversely, the estimated returns to labor are high (between 0.91 and 0.96 with 1 often being comprised in the con…dence interval). As a result, the constancy of returns to scale is rejected in none of our four sectors, and we can thus apply the theory laid out in the previous section.
Assuming that …rm j's capital stock continuously adjusts to equate the marginal productivity of capital to its user cost, r, so that rK jt = (1 ) Y jt for all (j; t); and replacing K jt with its optimal value into (12), one easily obtains the following expression for …rm j's mean labor product:
and, although our theory does not allow for productivity shocks, we nevertheless de…ne ln p j = E (ln p jt ) as the expectation of ln p jt with respect to transitory shocks jt .
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< Table 2 (production function parameter estimates) about here. >
Worker mobility
In this Section we are interested in the distribution of job spell durations, using a sample drawn from the French Labor Force Survey data. As all job transition processes are
The marginal productivity of the match thus multiplicatively depends on the worker's ability " and the …rm's mean labor product p jt .
Poisson, all corresponding durations are exponentially distributed. The distribution of job spell durations t has the following density, conditional on p:
where we know from equation (8) that p is distributed in the population of employed workers according to the density`(p) = (1
Because it is impossible to match the LFS worker data with the BRN …rm data (which is the only source of information on p), we treat p as unobserved heterogeneity and integrate it out from the joint likelihood of p and t,`(p) L (tjp). In order to obtain estimates of and 1 , we thus maximize the unconditional likelihood of job spell durations,
p) L (tjp) dp, which turns out to have a simple enough expression:
where
dx is the exponential integral function. 16 Note in particular that property of the theoretical model that is used is that there exists a scalar …rm index p-we do not need to de…ne it precisely-that is such that a worker employed at a …rm p moves to a …rm p 0 if and only if p 0 > p. Then stationarity implies that the steady-state distribution of p is`(p). The source of identi…cation in the unconditional inference approach is state dependence: unobserved heterogeneity makes the hazard rate a decreasing function of job spell duration, the slope of which identi…es 1 .
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Results. The unconditional ML estimates of , 1 and, most importantly, 1 are reported in Table 3 . In terms of 1 , i.e. the average number of outside contacts that an 16 See Abramowitz and Stegun (1972) . The exact likelihood that we maximize does take into account the fact that the panel covers a …xed number of periods so that some job durations are censored. However, it is straightforward to apply this integration methodology to likelihoods over both uncensored and censored spells. The algebra is just a bit more tedious. 17 For a graphical illustration of this state dependence, see Jolivet, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2005).
employed worker can expect before the next unemployment period, higher skill categories tend to be more mobile than lower skilled ones (with the remarkable exception of the Construction sector, where category 1 turns out to have the lowest value of 1 ). Now looking at the frequency of such contacts, which is measured by 1 , we …nd a similar pattern, in which workers with higher observed skill levels tend to get more frequent outside o¤ers than less skilled workers. Finally, the rate of job termination is everywhere a decreasing function of the skill index s (except again for Construction where categories 1, 2 and 3 exhibit values of that are roughly equal).
< Table 3 Straightforward algebra shows that this average is de…ned by Their results suggest that returns to seniority are small in France, even close to zero for some education groups. In a companion study using the same speci…cation, Buchinsky, show that the France-US gap in returns to tenure is explained by di¤erences in …rm-worker contact rates-i.e., 1 -within a model where the returns on seniority are the consequence of labor market competition caused by employed job search.
The wage equation
Consider again a market segment consisting of workers all in the same skill category.
For each …rm j in the sample and each period t, we compute the average wage of labor category s, say w sjt or w jt , omitting the s index for notational simplicity. Under the steady-state assumption and using the theory of wage determination and equilibrium wage distributions presented in section 2, w jt exhibits stationary ‡uctuations around the steady-state mean wage paid by …rm j, with mean labor productivity p j . Using the steady-state distributions derived in Section 2.4, Appendix D establishes that:
where = E" is the mean e¢ ciency of workers in that market and = + , and where L( ) is the steady-state distribution of employers'productivity across employees in that 
and estimate the steady-state distribution L s of workers of skill category s = 1; :::; 4
at …rms of any productivity p, by the empirical distribution of b p j , weighting each …rm in the sample by the average amount of type s labor in that …rm over the T observations periods ( c imposing the normalization 4 = 1 and where u jt = (u 1jt ; :::; u 4jt ) is a vector of transitory shocks due to worker in ‡ows and out ‡ows, of unrestricted variance. (We set the discount factor to an annual value of 5% for everyone, i.e. e = 0:95.)
We use the estimates of the production function to initiate the procedure.
Results. The estimation results are gathered in Table 4 . The numbers in parentheses are the bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000 replications of our entire estimation procedure, i.e. including the estimation of the transition parameters, on 1,000 resamples with replacement. Thus, the reported standard errors do account for the presence of nuisance parameters 1 and L s and for the fact that mean productivity b p j depends on the production function parameters s . We note that despite the number of nuisance parameters, those estimators are remarkably precise.
The …rst four columns of Table 4 display the bargaining power estimates and the last …ve columns the estimates of the production function parameters. Bargaining power is found to be an increasing function of observable ability, the least skilled two categories being endowed with a bargaining power close to zero. There are some small discrepancies across sectors but the most striking one is the bargaining power of the …rst category of workers (managers) in the Construction sector: it is close to one whereas it is never higher than a third in all other sectors. Also, bargaining power seems to be uniformly low for all labor categories in the Service sector.
< Table 4 (wage equation estimates) about here. > Looking at estimates of relative productivity, we …nd that the less skilled categories 3 and 4 have values of s very close to (yet slightly lower than) the wage ratios displayed in Table 1 . This is not the case for the higher-skill categories 1 and 2 where the ability ratios s are estimated substantially lower than the corresponding wage ratios. Productivity di¤erences thus only account for a fraction of inter-occupational wage di¤erentials. Other nonproductive factors have to be appealed to in order to explain cross-occupation wage inequality. The Construction sector is again remarkable in this respect as this is the sector where inter-occupational wage dispersion is highest. Productivity di¤erences across labor categories also seem larger here than in other sectors, but still the productivity ratio of managers in the Construction sector is not large enough to explain the relative wage of that category of workers.
To show how well equation (16) …ts the data we have plotted the predicted and observed (log) mean wages against (log) …rm productivity levels ln b p j for our four industries on Figure 1 . Each column pertains to one given industry, and each row to a given skill level. The solid curves represent the log wages predicted by the structural model. The dashed curves are nonparametric regressions of log wages on log labor productivity, which is what the model's prediction should be compared with. The gray dots correspond to the scatterplot. Finally, the solid lines represent the log of match productivity, ln( s p j ).
A glance at the various panels of Figure 1 shows that the model is reasonably good at predicting wages. More speci…cally, the Figure suggests two remarkable stylized facts.
One is that the wage paid by the lowest-p …rms in our four samples and for all categories of workers is always very close to match productivity (solid line) at p min . The other is that pro…t rates are strongly increasing with productivity: the gap between wages and productivity-which as we just saw is close to zero at p min -becomes substantial at higher values of p. Our structural model correctly captures this phenomenon.
< Figures 1 (wage-productivity relationship) about here. >
Going back to our bargaining power estimates, one …nal point is worth mentioning.
The point estimates gathered in Table 4 Lastly, the production function parameters ; 1 ; 2 ; 3 in Table 4 , estimated using the wage equation (16) , are well within the 95%-con…dence interval obtained by bootstrapping the GMM estimation of the production function. Estimating from value-added or from wages yields close estimates. We view this result as strongly supportive of the theory.
A robustness check: legal minimum wage omission biases
So far no mention has been made of an institutionalized wage ‡oor: both our theoretical model and our estimation procedure also ignore the presence of a minimum wage. Yet, the minimum wage is binding for approximately 15% of the employed workforce in France.
This observation begs the question of the extent to which our results depend on this omission. 19 The problem is that introducing a legal minimum wage in the theoretical model complicates the model structure by an order of magnitude. Yet, the critique is a serious one: intuitively, a binding minimum wage should lower the correlation between wage and productivity. Because, as we explained before, our main source of identi…cation for the bargaining power coe¢ cient is the slope of the wage-productivity relationship, our …nding of = 0 for low-skill workers might thus be largely driven by the fact that we ignored the presence of a binding minimum wage.
Part of the di¢ culty in introducing a minimum wage-say, w min -into the theoretical model is that with heterogeneous workers and …rms a wage ‡oor generates negative sorting: only matches with productivity such that p" w min are viable. However, assuming homogeneous worker ability ", sorting is no longer an issue and it becomes possible-however cumbersome-to adapt the estimation procedure to the new theoretical equations. 20 The supplemented material available on the Journal's website describes how the theory is modi…ed by the incorporation of a minimum wage, how to change the estimation procedure accordingly and shows the new results. Overall, we …nd that the minimum wage is not binding enough to substantially change our results. Figure 2 plots the densities (p), f s (p) and`s (p) for all categories of workers in all four industries. The overall shape is log-normal-like. The sampling distribution f s (p) is more concentrated than the distribution of productivity b p j across …rms, which is itself more concentrated than the distribution of employer productivity levels across workers,`s(p).
Distributions
A clear stochastic dominance pattern appears: f s ( ) is systematically to the left of ( ) which is in turn …rst-order stochastically dominated-although to a lesser extent-bỳ s ( ).
< Figures 2 (productivity densities) about here. >
The role of between-…rm competition in wage determination
In this section, we use our framework to disentangle the respective in ‡uence of the bargaining power and between-…rm competition on wage determination within each sector.
Measuring the contribution of between-…rm competition to worker market power
As we argued in the Introduction, the conventional approach to evaluating the workers'
bargaining power ignores job-to-job mobility, which amounts to shutting down between…rm competition for employed workers. Our model o¤ers a simple way of assessing the bias in the estimation of resulting from this simpli…cation. It is this bias that we now examine.
Ignoring job-to-job mobility amounts to forcing 1 = 0 in the wage equation (16) that now reads
where 0 denotes the value of corresponding to this counterfactual experiment. Thus, forbidding on-the-job search, the rent sharing equation takes the most standard form and the bargaining power thus simply measures the mean worker share of match rent p p min :
The rent sharing coe¢ cient 0 is a simple measure of worker market power. We obtain an estimator b 0 of 0 by replacing Ew and Ep in (18) by their empirical analogs. The values of b 0 are gathered in the second column of Table 5 -while for ease of comparison the …rst column of that table takes up the estimates of obtained from the full model with on-the-job search, b , which were already shown in Table 4 .
Comparing estimates with and without on-the-job search-i.e. comparing the …rst two columns of Table 5 -immediately shows that the bargaining power is always overestimated when one ignores job-to-job mobility. The magnitude of this upward bias varies across skill groups and sectors, but the bias always seems to be there, and is always important. This was expected as on-the-job search is a means by which an employee can force her employer to renegotiate her wage upward. Neglecting on-the-job search biases the workers' bargaining power upward to make it …t the actual share of compensation costs in value-added.
In the last column of Table 5 , we compute a rough measure of the contribution of between-…rm competition to worker market power 0 as
. We …nd that between-…rm competition is by far the most important source of market power for unskilled workers.
Concerning high-skilled workers, between 40 an 60 percent of the amount of rent they are able to capture is due to their bargaining power. The fact that low-skill workers have at the same time a low bargaining power and still are the category of workers with the lowest arrival rate of alternative o¤ers 1 could seem a contradiction. However, a low contact rate may simply re ‡ect a low demand for unskilled labor, leading to scarcity of vacancies for low-skill jobs. Lastly, an important component of the bargaining power is the capacity to voice claims during the negotiation process, which capacity may be greater for more educated workers.
< Table 4 (Mean worker share of match rents) about here. >
Counterfactual evaluation of the e¤ect of on-the-job search on rent sharing
We estimate the average waiting time between two outside o¤ers to lie between 3.5 and 19
years. Outside o¤ers are thus rather rare events. This low value of the (employed) worker…rm contact rate may seem at odds with our …nding that inter…rm competition explains most of the workers'rent share. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, we should begin by emphasizing that, from our cross-section, steady-state perspective, what matters in the determination of the workers'rent share is not how many …rms workers can get to compete for their services per unit time (which is what the contact rate 1 measures), but rather the number of …rms a worker can bring into competition per employment spell,
i.e. before that worker's surplus is reset to zero by the occurrence of a layo¤. This latter number is precisely 1 = 1 = , which is the correct measure of competitive intensity in our model labor market. In other words, again from our cross-section perspective, measuring competitive intensity requires a "rescaling of time" in terms of the average length of an employment spell, 1= : labor markets with very low …rm-worker contact rate may thus still appear very "competitive" from this point of view if they are also characterized by a long average duration of uninterrupted employment. Moreover, we shall now see that it only takes very little between-…rm competition measured in this particular way-i.e.
it only takes small values of the parameter 1 -to provide the workers with a large share of the match rent.
This is illustrated on Figure 3 , which is constructed as follows: First, we simulate arti…cial wages using our wage equation and our estimates as parameter values, with the exception that we force to equal zero and 1 to cover the interval [0; 15]. That is, we simulate the wages that workers would receive if they had zero bargaining power, in various competitive environments ranging from 1 = 0-job-to-job mobility is ruled out, implying no between-employer competition-to 1 = 15-job-to-job mobility is very easy, implying …erce between-employer competition. We then compute workers'market power, 0 , corresponding to each value of 1 within our range. This …nding implies that relatively modest values of 1 are enough to guarantee a large share of the match rent for the workers. In other words, it only takes little between-…rm competition to raise the workers'wages by a substantial amount.
A candidate explanation of that phenomenon goes as follows. When a worker …nds his/her …rst job, s/he is initially unemployed. At that point the negotiation outcome is favorable to the employer as the worker's only outside option is to remain unemployed.
The …rst outside o¤er raised by the new employee is of great (expected) value as it allows him/her to renegotiate his/her wage under much more favorable circumstances. The second outside o¤er is already less valuable (still in expected terms), as the worker's wage was already raised due to the …rst o¤er, and it is therefore less likely that the second o¤er will get the worker a substantial additional wage increase. As new outside o¤ers come along, the worker's situation improves, and the expected gain from the next outside o¤er declines (especially if the distribution of …rm productivity levels is not very dispersed).
Generally speaking, the returns to on-the-job search are expected to be rapidly declining with the number of outside o¤ers raised since the beginning of the job spell. At this point we should insist once again on the fact that all this is compatible with very low values of the …rm-worker contact rate 1 , so long as layo¤s are su¢ ciently rare events,
i.e. so long as spells of continuous employment are on average long enough to leave time for employed workers to raise a few outside job o¤ers. Table   3 ). We see that those values are typically at the very beginning of the " ‡at region" of the 1 -workers'rent share relationship. A way to express this result is to say that encouraging between-…rm competition on the French labor market would likely not have a large impact on wages.
Conclusion
This paper is the …rst attempt at estimating the in ‡uence of productivity, the bargaining power and between-…rm competition on wages in a uni…ed framework. We use an original equilibrium job search model with on-the-job search and wage bargaining as a theoretical structure, which we bring to the data. The combined use of a panel of matched employeremployee data and of LFS data allows us to implement a multi-stage estimation procedure that yields separate estimates of the search friction parameters (job destruction rates, arrival rates of job o¤ers) and labor productivity at the …rm level. These estimated values of the friction parameters and …rm productivity levels are then used to estimate the bargaining power that appears in the wage equation delivered by the theoretical model.
Our main …nding is that between-…rm competition plays a prominent role in wage determination in France over the period 1993-2000. The bargaining power of workers turns out to be very low-typically between 0 and a third-in all industries, up to a few exceptions among high-skilled workers. However, we de…nitely …nd that skilled workers have bargaining power, albeit less than is usually estimated, and are thus able to capture a substantial share of the job surplus for reasons that cannot be entirely explained by the competition for labor services between employers. This is an interesting result which calls for further research in order to better understand what lies inside the "black box"of the bargaining power parameter . The game-theoretic model featured in this paper interprets this parameter in terms of di¤erent response times for workers and …rms and di¤erent time discount rates. But we have very little empirical evidence on the dependence of these variables on such intuitive candidate determinants as education or trade union density for example.
Our results also rely on simplifying assumptions that would need further scrutiny.
We now list three very desirable extensions.
One set of extensions would improve the capacity of the model to describe individual wage dynamics. Firstly, the current version of the model lacks productivity shocks. This is absolutely not a trivial extension as it implies dealing with the problem of when and why wage contracts are renegotiated following productivity shocks. Yet it would yield much richer and more realistic wage dynamics, would endogenize layo¤s and would potentially explain why wages change more when there is an employer change than otherwise. A second desirable extension is to allow for experience accumulation. This is also not a trivial extension as, even if the experience accumulation process is exogenous, the contracts that …rms and workers would now negotiate are not single wages any more but full experience-wage pro…les (see Carrillo-Tudela, 2005).
A second extension goes into the direction of endogenizing matching parameters to make them a function of worker search e¤ort and …rm vacancy-posting behavior. There we need to model labor demand and make the model a full general-equilibrium searchmatching model à la Pissarides. This is another non trivial extension. 21 Mortensen (2000) already bridged the gap between equilibrium search models and search-matching models. We need to follow him in that direction.
The last extension that we have in mind relates to the very strong assumptions that we have made about the value of non labor time ("b) and about the absence of heterogeneity in the search-matching parameters. If one makes job o¤er arrival rates worker-speci…c or if one changes the form of the ‡ow-value of non-labor time, then one loses the property that there is no sorting in equilibrium. For example, if good-quality workers receive alternative o¤ers more often, then they will climb the wage and productivity ladder faster and one gets positive sorting. Solving such an equilibrium search model with sorting and estimating it is surely very di¢ cult, but nevertheless constitutes a very promising area for future research.
Appendix: Details of some theoretical results

A Wage bargaining
This Appendix contains the details of the two negotiation games underlying the wage equations used throughout the paper. Both games are based on Rubinstein's (1982) alternating o¤ers game.
A.1 Bargaining with unemployed workers
The negotiation game between a type-" unemployed worker and a type-p employer is as follows. The worker and the employer make alternating o¤ers. When one of the players o¤ers a contract (a wage), the other player either accepts or rejects the o¤er. If the o¤er is accepted, then the bargaining ends and the o¤ered contract is implemented. If the o¤er is rejected, then the game goes on to a next round after a short time delay, denoted by e if the worker just rejected an o¤er by the …rm or by f if the …rm just rejected an o¤er by the worker. In the next round, the player who last rejected an o¤er makes a counter-o¤er, which again can either be accepted or rejected. The game goes on in this way over an in…nite horizon. It is also assumed that the match is destroyed at Poisson rate s and that the worker can receive wage o¤ers from outside …rms at rate during the negotiation game. The discount rates of the worker and the …rm are denoted by and f respectively.
Proposition 1
The outcome of the negotiation game described above is a wage 0 ("; p) that solves:
when e ! 0; f ! 0; q ! +1; with = f =( e + f ).
taxes or in unemployment insurance bene…ts-not only a¤ects wages but also labor demand, which is currently mostly exogenous.
Proof: The proof is little more than an application of a result by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, p. 87 ). Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) have shown that the subgame perfect equilibrium of the negotiation game is a pair of stationary strategies, in which the …rm (worker) o¤ers the wage w f (w e ) that makes the other party indi¤erent between accepting this wage o¤er instantaneously and waiting their turn to make a counter-o¤er. More formally, assuming that e and f are "small" intervals of time, (w f ; w e ) solves:
b" e + (1 s e e ) V ("; w e ; p) + s e V 0 (") + e e V ("; w f ; p) i ;
where V ("; w f ; p) is the value to the worker if s/he accepts the …rm's o¤er w f and the right-hand side is the value if s/he refuses, and, similarly,
where ("; w e ; p) is the …rm's pro…t if it accepts worker's wage o¤er w e and e V ("; w; p) and e ("; w; p) denote the worker's and …rm's (…nite) continuation values of the game that is started should the worker receive an outside o¤er from another …rm, and where it has been assumed that the …rm's ‡ow payo¤ from a vacant job slot is 0 and that the present discounted value of such a vacant job is 0 .
These last two equations can be rewritten as: Assuming that the …rm's valuation of a vacant job slot is zero, that is: 0 = 0 = 0 (as would result from free entry and exit into the search market), we can de…ne the the surplus of an ("; p) match as S ("; p) = ("; w; p) + V ("; w; p) V 0 ("). 22 This implies, together with the identity ("; "p; p) = 0, that ("; w; p) = V ("; "p; p) V ("; w; p) for all w. Thus, Our interpretation is that the bargaining power does not depend on the discount factor, on the destruction rate of operating jobs, or on the arrival rate of job o¤ers if these three parameters are small enough compared to the job destruction rate during the negotiation process. 23 
A.2 Renegotiation
When an employed worker contacts an outside …rm, s/he has the opportunity to renegotiate her/his wage according to the following game:
1. The …rms make simultaneous noncooperative wage o¤ers; 2. The worker either chooses one wage o¤er and signs a new contract or keeps the preexisting contract;
3. If the worker has chosen one wage o¤er at step 2, some time elapses. Then the worker can initiate a renegotiation with the …rm whose o¤er has been refused at stage 2. This renegotiation obeys the same rules as the negotiation game between unemployed workers and …rms except now that the outside option is not unemployment but the job and wage contract accepted at step 2.
The negotiation game that is played between two …rms and an initially employed worker resembles the game between a …rm and an unemployed worker except that the former has three players instead of two. Two steps have been added to enable the worker to maneuver so as to build him/herself an optimal credible threat point in the renegotiation subgame (step 3). Namely, if the worker accepts the o¤er of the poaching …rm at step 2, s/he quits the incumbent …rm and this o¤er becomes her/his threat point in the renegotiation. Conversely, her/his threat point is the o¤er of the incumbent employer if that o¤er is accepted at step 2.
22 Shimer (2005) considers a bargaining game in all respects similar to this one, except that incumbent employers cannot match outside o¤ers. The current wage then determines the duration of the match and the bargaining outcome therefore does not satisfy a "surplus splitting" rule. If employers can counter outside o¤ers, mobility is determined by match productivity, not by the wage, and the surplus is then the sum of …rm's pro…t and worker's net value. 23 Note that assuming f = (…rms and workers use the same discount rate) also implies that only depends on the players'response times. What is di¤erent from equation (1) in this case is the worker's threat point, as it appears in equation (A.5).
This game can appear somewhat unrealistic at …rst glance, as it gives the employee the option to momentarily quit her/his initial employer to eventually return with a new contract at the end of the renegotiation. Such back-and-forth worker movements do not happen in the real world. Neither do they in our game, as we wish to emphasize, since temporarily quitting to a less attractive employer is only a threat available for the worker to use, which is never implemented in equilibrium.
Proposition 2
The renegotiation game has the following outcome when a type-" employee paid a wage w in a type-p …rm receives an outside o¤ er from a type-p 0 …rm.
If p 0 p, the worker stays at the type-p …rm, with a new wage ("; p 0 ; p) de…ned by:
if ("; p 0 ; p) > w or stays at the type-p …rm with the wage w otherwise.
If p 0 > p, the worker moves to the type-p 0 job, where s/he gets a wage ("; p; p 0 ) that solves:
Proof: The renegotiation game is solved by backward induction. Let us denote by w 0 1 and w 1 the wage o¤ers made at step 1 by …rm p 0 and p respectively. We assume that if the worker receives two o¤ers yielding the same value, s/he chooses to stay with the incumbent employer.
At step 3, the renegotiation follows the same rules as the negotiation between unemployed workers and …rms-only with di¤erent outside options, and possibly di¤erent values of the parameters, notably the arrival rate of outside job o¤ers . Therefore, the worker who accepted a wage o¤er w 1 at step 2 and renegotiates with …rm p 0 at step 3 ends up with a wage w that solves:
b" + sV ("; w 1 ; p) + e V ("; w; p 0 ) 1 e ("; 0 (";p);p)
where is de…ned as in equation (A.6). As s ! +1, this becomes:
. Similarly, the worker who accepted a wage o¤ers w 0 1 at step 2 and renegotiates with …rm p at step 3 gets a wage w that solves, when s ! +1:
These two bargaining solutions imply the following decision pattern for the worker:
If the worker has accepted w 0 1 at step 2: bargain and work with p if V ("; "p; p) > V ("; w 0 1 ; p 0 ), and otherwise keep w 0 1 .
If the worker has accepted w 1 at step 2: bargain and work with p 0 if V ("; "p 0 ; p 0 ) > V ("; w 1 ; p), and otherwise keep w 1 .
At step 2, the worker accepts the wage o¤er that leaves him/her with the highest value. If s/he accepts w 1 , s/he knows that s/he will trigger a renegotiation at step 3 if and only if V ("; "p 0 ; p 0 ) > V ("; w 1 ; p). Thus, the value of accepting w 1 at step 2 equals:
Similarly, the value of accepting w 0 1 at step 2 equals:
At step 1, employers make simultaneous o¤ers. Both employers o¤er the lowest possible wage that attracts the worker while leaving them with nonnegative pro…ts.
If p 0 > p, employer p 0 must o¤er w 0 1 such that V ("; w 0 1 ; p 0 ) V ("; "p; p) in order to attract the worker at step 3 because the maximum wage that employer p can a¤ord to o¤er is "p and yields a value of V ("; "p; p) to the worker. If the worker accepts w 1 = "p, then at step 3 s/he will eventually end up being hired at …rm p 0 for a wage ("; p; p 0 ) that solves:
Firm p cannot bid this wage which exceeds "p. In order to avoid wasting time between steps 2 and 3 of the bargaining game, …rm p 0 immediately o¤ers w 0 1 = ("; p; p 0 ) at step 1, which the worker immediately accepts at step 2 without initiating a renegotiation at step 3.
If p 0 p, things are exactly symmetric: employer p must o¤er w 1 such that V ("; w 1 ; p) V ("; "p 0 ; p 0 ) in order to retain the worker at step 3 because the maximum wage that employer p 0 can a¤ord to o¤er yields V ("; "p 0 ; p 0 ) to the worker. If the worker accepts w 0 1 = "p 0 , then at step 3 s/he will eventually end up staying at …rm p for a wage ("; p 0 ; p) that solves:
Firm p 0 cannot bid this wage which exceeds "p. And again to avoid wasting time in unnecessary negotiations, …rm p o¤ers ("; p 0 ; p) immediately, and the worker accepts it immediately, with the quali…cation that it has to improve on her/his previous situation, i.e. ("; p 0 ; p) > w. If ("; p 0 ; p) w, the worker keeps the previous contract with the wage w and discards any o¤er from p 0 .
This completes the characterization of the subgame perfect equilibrium of our bargaining game and the proof of the Proposition.
A.3 Additional remarks about those bargaining games
It is worth introducing some extra notation at this point (for use in the main text): we see that the minimal value of p 0 for which "something happens" (i.e. either causing a wage increase or an employer change) is q("; w; p) such that V ("; w; p) = V ("; "p; p) + (1 )V ("; "q("; w; p); q("; w; p)); (A.9) which is equivalent to ("; "q ("; w; p) ; q ("; w; p)) = w. We should also once more emphasize two main assumptions underlying the two wage equations (1) and (2) that we use in the paper. The …rst (and most disputable) one is that the rate of job destruction s is high while workers and …rms bargain. The second one is that we assume that is the equal across worker-…rm pairs (in particular, unemployed workers are assumed to have the same bargaining power as "insiders". According to the game-theoretic interpretation that we o¤er in this Appendix, this is tantamount to assuming that response times ( e and f ) are equal across all worker-…rm pairs.
B Equilibrium wage determination
Here we derive the precise closed-form of equilibrium wages 0 ("; p) and ("; p; p 0 ) de…ned in equations (1) and (2) respectively. The …rst step is to derive the value functions V 0 ( ) and V ( ). Since o¤ers accrue to unemployed workers at rate 0 , V 0 (") solves the following Bellman equation:
where p inf is such that V ("; "p inf ; p inf ) = V 0 ("). Now turning to employed workers, consider a type-" worker employed at a type-p …rm. Since layo¤s occur at rates , we may now write the Bellman equation solved by the value function V ("; w; p):
Let us denote by p max the upper support of p: Using the rent splitting rules established in Proposition 2 yields the equivalent expression:
Imposing w = "p in (B.12), taking the derivative, and noticing that the de…nition (A.9) of q("; w; p) implies that q("; "p; p) = p, one gets: dV dp ("; "p; p) = "
Then, integrating by parts in equation (B.12):
dx: (B.14)
Let w = ("; p 0 ; p) with p 0 p. Straightforward algebra shows that:
The lower support of the distribution of marginal productivity levels, p min , cannot fall short of the value p inf such that V ("; "p inf ; p inf ) = V 0 ("). Using the de…nitions (B.10), of V 0 ("); and (B.14), of V ("; w; p); this identity yields:
dx: (B.16) (Note that the value of p inf is independent of ". This result holds true for any homogeneous speci…cation of the utility function.) Finally, as the bargaining outcome implies (B.15), the identity V ("; "p inf ; p inf ) = V 0 (") implies the following alternative de…nition of 0 ("; p):
dx: (B.17)
C Equilibrium wage distributions
The G (wj"; p)`("; p) (1 u)M workers of type ", employed at …rms of type p, and paid less than w 2 [ 0 ("; p); "p] leave this category either because they are laid o¤ (rate ), or because they receive an o¤er from a …rm with mpl p q ("; w; p) which grants them a wage increase or induces them to leave their current …rm (rate 1 F [q ("; w; p)]). On the in ‡ow side, workers entering the category (ability ", wage w, mpl p) come from two distinct sources. Either they are hired away from a …rm less productive than q ("; w; p), or they come from unemployment. The steady-state equality between ‡ows into and out of the stocks G (wj"; p)`("; p) thus takes the form: since 0 u = (1 u). Applying this identity for w = "p (which has the property that G ("pj"; p) = 1 and q ("; "p; p) = p), we get:
"; x)dx f (p); which solves as`( "; p) = 1 + 1
This shows that`("; p) has the form h (")`(p) (absence of sorting), and gives the expression of (p). Hence the equations (8) and (9) . Equation (8) can be integrated between p min and p to obtain (7) . Substituting (7), (8) and (9) into (C.18) …nally yields equation (10) .
D Derivation of E[T (w)jp] for any function T (w)
The lowest paid type-" worker in a type-p …rm is one that has just been hired, therefore earning 0 ("; p) = ("; p inf ; p), while the highest-paid type-" worker in that …rm earns his marginal productivity "p. Thus, the support of the within-…rm earnings distribution of type " workers for any type-p …rm belongs to the interval [p inf ; p]: Noticing that e G(qjp) = G ( ("; q; p)j"; p) has a mass point at p inf and is otherwise continuous over the interval The entrants' wage 0 ("; p) equals ("; p inf ; p). This implies that equation (D.19) can be further simpli…ed by noticing that if the lower support of viable productivity levels p inf equals the lower support of observed productivity levels p min (which amounts to assuming free entry and exit of …rms on the search market), then the second term in the right hand side vanishes, changing (D. 19) to: We shall maintain this assumption throughout the paper. 24 Next, using equation (8) 
